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 Feigning of mental health and neurocognitive symptoms is a serious concern, 
particularly in forensic settings. While researchers have developed several assessment 
tools to detect feigning, little research exists regarding the pattern of scores on these 
measures over time. This dissertation involved secondary data analyses using the publicly 
available dataset from the study entitled, “Evaluation of the Psychological Effects of 
Administrative Segregation in Colorado, 2007-2010” (O’Keefe & Klebe, 2014). 
Participants were 270 adult male inmates who were administered the Structured 
Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS; Widows & Smith, 2005) along with 
measures of psychopathology at five time points (baseline and 3, 6, 9, and 12 month 
follow-ups). This dissertation sought to investigate patterns of scores on the SIMS across 
the five administrations in order to examine the consistency of inmates’ reporting over 
time. Additional research questions included comparing two different recommended cut-
scores for the SIMS among inmates with and without mental illness and investigating 
other factors that may influence evaluees’ SIMS scores over time. At all time points, 
inmates with mental illness received significantly higher mean SIMS Total Scores 
compared to inmates without mental illness. Indeed, 75.5% of inmates with mental illness 
scored in the feigning range at least once, compared to 35.7% for inmates without mental 
illness. Test-retest reliability for the SIMS Total Score at all combination of time points 
revealed moderate to high reliability (r ranging from .61 to .83). McNemar’s tests 
indicated similar proportions of participants scored in the feigning range at all 
 
iv 
combinations of time points, with the exception of the Time 1 and Time 5 comparison. 
Repeated measures MANOVAs were used to compare subgroups of inmates (i.e., Never, 
Sometimes, or Always Feigning) on measures of psychopathology (i.e., the PAS and 
BPRS). Results revealed inmates in the Always Feigning group tended to receive higher 
mean scores on the PAS and BPRS compared to inmates in the Sometimes Feigning 
Group, and both groups scored higher than inmates in the Never Feigning group. Scores 
on these other measures also tended to decrease from the baseline administration to later 
time points. Regression models revealed that changes in scores on the PAS and BPRS 
predicted changes in scores on the SIMS; 25.4% of the variance in the model was 
explained by these two predictors, with the PAS having the stronger influence. Neither 
housing placement nor mental health needs significantly predicted changes in SIMS 
scores; however, a moderate-strength correlation suggested regression to the mean 
explained some of the change in SIMS scores over time.  
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 A primary concern for mental health treatment providers and evaluators is the 
provision of appropriate treatment to the many individuals who need it, a task that can be 
difficult given the limited time and resources available in most settings. Thus, it is 
important to be able to differentiate between individuals truly in need of services and 
those who may be exaggerating or feigning their symptoms. The need to distinguish 
between these groups is particularly salient in forensic settings, where an evaluator’s 
opinion regarding symptoms of mental illness can influence the outcome of criminal and 
civil cases. Researchers have developed several assessment tools for detecting feigned 
psychopathology, and meta-analyses provide strong support for the ability of scores on 
many of these measures to detect feigning (Green & Rosenfeld, 2011; Hawes & 
Boccaccini, 2009; Rogers, Sewell, Martin, & Vitacco, 2003).  
 Most feigning measure studies report findings based on a single administration of 
the instrument, an understandable focus given that clinicians are typically interested in 
detecting feigning at one specific point in time. However, studying patterns of scores 
across multiple administrations of the same measure has the potential to provide useful 
information about both the psychometric properties of these measures and how consistent 
evaluees tend to be in their response styles. For example, based on the current research 
literature, we do not know how common it is for evaluees to consistently score in the 
feigning range across multiple administrations of the same measure, or for them to 
vacillate between the honest and feigning ranges. If evaluees do fluctuate in and out of 
feigning ranges, it is unknown whether these fluctuations are best explained by 
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corresponding changes in psychopathology symptoms, by changes in response style, by 
measurement error, or perhaps based on evaluee characteristics. The purpose of this 
dissertation was to study patterns of scores over multiple administrations of the same 
feigning screener across a 12-month period, thereby contributing to our knowledge of the 
consistency of self-reported feigning across time.  
 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders- Fifth Edition (DSM-
5; American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013) defines malingering as “the 
intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological 
symptoms, motivated by external incentives such as avoiding military duty, avoiding 
work, obtaining financial compensation, evading criminal prosecution, or obtaining 
drugs” (APA, 2013, p. 726). A related term, which must be distinguished from 
malingering, is feigning: “the deliberate fabrication or gross exaggeration of 
psychological or physical symptoms without any assumptions about its goals” (Rogers, 
2018a, p. 6). Thus, assessments developed to evaluate false or exaggerated symptoms can 
be used to evaluate feigning, but without being able to assess the individual’s specific 
motivations for feigning, they cannot establish malingering (Melton, Petrila, Poythress, 
Slobogin, Otto, Mossman, & Condie, 2018; Rogers, 2018a). For this reason, the term 
feigning will be used throughout the current study, rather than malingering.  
 It is important to note that the presence of feigning does not eliminate the 
possibility of genuine symptoms (Melton et al., 2018; Rogers, 2018a). Rather, the term 
feigning may be used to describe the response style of an individual who is reporting 
more symptoms, or more severe symptoms, than would be objectively observed. Resnick, 
West, and Wooley (2018) discussed three categories of malingering: Pure malingering 
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refers to feigning of symptoms that the person does not experience at all. Partial 
malingering refers to the actions of an individual who experiences genuine symptoms but 
who purposefully exaggerates them. Finally, false imputation refers to the situation in 
which an individual experiences genuine symptoms but consciously attributes them to the 
wrong source. Partial malingering occurs most commonly of these three response styles, 
while pure malingering is more rare.  
 Symptom feigning can take numerous forms, including thought disorder or 
psychosis, anxiety or depression, posttraumatic stress symptoms, medical or pain 
symptoms, cognitive or neuropsychological impairment, or even impairment of specific 
psycholegal abilities such as competency to stand trial (Bender, 2018; Granacher & 
Berry, 2018; Lezak, Howieson, Bigler, & Tranel, 2012; Melton et al., 2018; Resnick & 
Knoll, 2018; Resnick, West, & Wooley, 2018; Rogers, 2018a; Soliman & Resnick, 
2010). Individuals choosing to feign may do so within just one of these domains or may 
combine characteristics from several. It should also be noted that malingering is a 
situational, rather than static, response style (Rogers, 2018a; Rogers, Vitacco, & Kurus, 
2010). Thus, feigning is best understood as a response style for specific circumstances 
instead of as a stable characteristic of the individual. Rogers (2018) wrote, “Some 
practitioners use- at least implicitly- the flawed logic ‘once a malingerer, always a 
malingerer.’ On the contrary, most efforts at malingering appear to be related to specific 
objectives in a particular context” (p. 8). Individuals may feign symptoms from one 
domain in one set of circumstances, and then may feign symptoms from a different 
domain or choose not to feign at all in a different set of circumstances.  
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Individuals receiving treatment or evaluation in forensic settings have numerous 
external incentives to feign or exaggerate symptoms of mental illness. Most significantly, 
this could include delaying adjudication, avoiding culpability, or reducing the sentence of 
a criminal offense. Other threats to validity in a forensic context include the importance 
of evaluations, the coerced nature of court referrals, and pressures from attorneys (Melton 
et al., 2018), as well as the possibility of transfer to a hospital or mental health unit, 
which is likely to be less secure and/or more comfortable than jail (Soliman & Resnick, 
2010; Vitacco, 2018). In regards to the prevalence of feigning in forensic settings, 
clinician estimates range from 15% to 18%, and research findings range from less than 
10% to over 25% (Boccaccini, Murrie, & Duncan, 2006). In a more recent review of the 
literature, Wygant and Lareau (2015) found that exaggeration of symptoms was estimated 
to occur 18 to 33% of the time in personal injury, medical, disability, and criminal cases. 
These estimates are troubling, particularly given the high stakes of forensic evaluations 
and the limited bed space available in state hospitals (Ray, 2009). Furthermore, although 
it has been posited that clients in therapy and treatment settings “have little incentive to 
practice conscious deception and manipulation” (Melton et al., 2018, p. 57), individuals 
in these non-forensic settings (i.e., clinical or counseling) may also be motivated by 
incentives such as obtainment of psychotropic medications, disability benefits, shelter, or 
avoidance of military service (Resnick & Knoll, 2018; Vitacco, 2018). Indeed, the results 
of surveys of over 500 forensic experts indicate that malingering is not rare in either 
clinical or forensic contexts (Rogers, 2018a). Melton and colleagues (2018) wrote: 
Given the significant potential for deception and the implications for the 
validity of their findings, mental health professionals should have a low 
threshold for suspecting less-than-candid responding. At the same time, 
given the limitations of science referenced above, and the weight that 
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labels used to describe response styles (e.g., ‘malingerer,’ ‘faker’) carry 
with legal decisionmakers, the examiner should make sure that 
conclusions about an examinee’s response style have a solid foundation. 
(p. 57) 
 
 Given that feigning is not a rare occurrence and is observed in multiple settings, it 
is important for clinicians to have both the knowledge and tools needed to accurately 
assess the veracity of reported symptoms. In order to make conclusions, diagnoses, and 
recommendations for treatment, evaluators first need to know whether the data collected 
is valid (Lezak et al., 2012). In forensic settings, mental health testimony is common in 
criminal proceedings involving culpability or sanity, competency to stand trial or to be 
executed, mitigation of sentencing, and intellectual disability (Haydt, 2015). In a survey 
of 102 forensic evaluators, respondents reported evaluating malingering or response style 
an average of 39.61 times in the previous year (McLaughlin & Kan, 2014). During 
evaluations of response style or malingering, the evaluators reported using forensic 
assessment instruments (FAIs) or forensically relevant instruments (FRIs) an average of 
66.44% of the time, multiscale inventories 52.21% of the time, and cognitive or 
neuropsychological instruments 21.41% of the time.  
 Some experts have argued that forensic assessments should routinely include 
evaluation of response style or malingering. Rogers (2018) wrote, “When the outcome of 
an evaluation has important consequences, malingering should be systematically 
evaluated. Its professional neglect is a serious omission” (p. 8). However, understanding 
the importance of evaluating symptom veracity must be accompanied by evidence-based 
methods of doing so. A review of the malingering literature shows that clinicians and 
researchers use and recommend a variety of different methods in order to assess feigning, 
many of which are conflicting. The ability to detect feigned mental illness has been called 
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an “advanced clinical skill,” as the clinician must understand and be able to recognize the 
variety of phenomenologically disparate symptoms experienced by individuals with 
genuine psychological disorders (Resnick & Knoll, 2008).   
Although some clinicians continue to believe in the superiority of clinical 
judgment over psychological assessments, a variety of factors have been demonstrated to 
limit the accuracy of unstructured clinical judgment (Borum, Otto, & Golding, 1993; 
Gottfried, Schenk, & Vitacco, 2016). Furthermore, no studies have been able to 
demonstrate that evaluators can detect malingering based solely on unstructured clinical 
interviews (Harris & Resnick, 2003; Melton et al., 2018) and the admissibility of expert 
testimony based solely on clinical interviews has been questioned (Melton et al., 2018). 
Unstructured clinical judgment is also subject to numerous memory and judgment biases 
(Melton et al., 2018) that can be reduced through the use of structured interviews or 
assessments. In comparison, numerous studies have demonstrated the utility of 
psychological assessments in the detection of feigned psychosis, affective symptoms, and 
cognitive impairment (Melton et al., 2018; Resnick & Knoll, 2018). These assessments 
include specialized response bias measures as well as broadband measures containing 
validity scales, indices, and discriminant functions. The most widely used and researched 
measures are summarized in the following section, followed by a more in-depth 
discussion of the Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS; Widows 
& Smith, 2005).  
Measures of Response Bias 
Broadband measures. The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory- Second 
Edition (MMPI-2; Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, & Kraemmer, 1989; Butcher 
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et al., 2001) and the MMPI-2-Restructured Form (MMPI-2-RF; Ben-Porath & Tellegen, 
2008) are widely used and researched multi-scale measures of personality and 
psychopathology. The MMPI contains a number of validity and supplementary scales 
designed to assess the respondent’s response style, including malingering, defensiveness, 
and inconsistent responding (Wygant, Walls, Brothers, & Berry, 2018). The scales most 
applicable to the detection of overreporting response styles include 
Infrequency/Infrequent Responses (F/F-r), Back Infrequency (FB), Infrequency 
Psychopathology/Infrequent Psychopathology Responses (FP/FP-r), Fake Bad/Symptom 
Validity (FBS/FBS-r), Inconsistent Response (IR), Gough Dissimulation (Ds), Infrequent 
Somatic Responses (Fs), and Response Bias Scale (RBS). These validity scales, 
particularly Fp and F, have been found to differentiate between honest responding and 
feigning in both known-groups (Sellbom, Toomey, Wygant, Kucharski, & Duncan, 2010) 
and analogue simulation (Sellbom & Bagby, 2010) design studies.  
The Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey, 1991, 2007) is a widely used 
multi-scale measure of personality and psychopathology. The PAI contains several 
validity and supplementary scales designed to assess response style. The validity scales 
pertaining most to the detection of overreporting response styles include Negative 
Impression Management (NIM), Malingering Index (MAL), Rogers Discriminant 
Function (RDF), Negative Distortion Scale (NDS), and Multiscale Feigning Index (MFI) 
(Boccaccini & Hart, 2018). In a thorough meta-analysis of studies investigating the 
ability of PAI scales to detect overreporting, NIM, MAL, and RDF were found to have 
large predictive effects (Hawes & Boccaccini, 2009).  
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The Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory- Fourth Edition (MCMI-IV; Millon, 
Grossman, & Millon, 2015) is another widely used multi-scale measure of personality 
and psychopathology. The MCMI-IV contains several validity scales pertaining to the 
detection of overreporting response styles, including the Validity Scale (V), Disclosure 
Scale (X), Desirability Scale (Y) and Debasement Scale (Z). Due to its recent publication, 
this latest revision of the MCMI has little research regarding its ability to detect feigned 
psychopathology. Furthermore, the literature on the previous edition (MCMI-III; Millon, 
Millon, Davis, & Grossman, 2006) was not promising, leading multiple researchers to 
question its ability to detect feigning or malingering (Berry & Schipper, 2007; Melton et 
al., 2018). A recent review of MCMI-IV validity scale research concluded that the 
shortcomings continue to apply and “practitioners should avoid using the MCMI-IV to 
differentiate between honest and dishonest responders in actual forensic cases” 
(Boccaccini & Hart, 2018, p. 293).  
Specialized measures. The Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms (SIRS; 
Rogers, Bagby, & Dickens, 1992) and its second edition (SIRS-2; Rogers, Sewell, & 
Gillard, 2010) are widely used, well-validated measures of feigned mental disorders and 
are considered the gold standard for the classification of feigning by many malingering 
researchers (Rogers, 2018b). Melton and colleagues (2018) wrote, “The SIRS remains the 
most praised and best-validated measure” (p. 59) for evaluation of feigned 
psychopathology. The SIRS-2’s eight primary scales use validated detection strategies 
derived from the empirical literature. These scales include Rare Symptoms (RS), 
Symptom Combinations (SC), Improbable or Absurd Symptoms (IA), Blatant Symptoms 
(BL), Subtle Symptoms (SU), Selectivity of Symptoms (SEL), Severity of Symptoms 
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(SEV), and Reported vs. Observed (RO). Utilizing a flow chart of decision rules, the 
examinee’s response style is classified into one of several categories: Genuine, 
Disengagement, Indeterminate-General, Indeterminate-Evaluate, or Feigning. The SIRS-
2 manual lists sensitivity and specificity estimates of .80 and .975, respectively, for the 
classification of feigned mental disorders (Rogers, Sewell, & Gillard, 2010).  
The Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM; Tombaugh, 1996) is a visual 
recognition measure designed to detect feigned memory impairment. The manual 
provides two cut scores; one based on below-chance performance and the other based on 
comparison to patients with genuine head injuries and cognitive impairments (Tombaugh, 
1996). Validation studies have found the measure to be sensitive to feigning but 
insensitive to a wide array of genuine neurological impairments (Tombaugh, 1996, 2002). 
The Validity Indicator Profile (VIP; Frederick, 1997) is validity measure designed 
to assess whether the examinee’s performance on other cognitive measures should be 
considered a valid representation of his or her abilities. The VIP utilizes a two-alternative 
forced choice procedure over the course of 100 nonverbal and 78 verbal problems. 
Following administration, the items are reordered in terms of difficulty level, allowing 
the examinee’s performance curve to be compared to the standard shape of the 
performance curve for compliant test-takers. Based on the performance curve measures 
and consistency measures, the examinee’s performance is classified as either compliant 
(i.e., genuine) or one of three invalid response styles (Frederick & Crosby, 2000). In a 
review of the VIP’s development and validation, effect sizes of test performance between 
individuals motivated to perform well and those motivated to perform poorly were large 
to very large (Frederick, 2002).  
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The Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test (M-FAST; Miller, 2001) is a 
brief structured interview, developed as a screening measure for feigned psychopathology 
in forensic settings (Smith, 2018). The 25 items on the M-FAST were written in an effort 
to utilize empirically-based detection strategies, such as those used in the SIRS (Miller, 
2001). Its scales include Reported vs. Observed (RO), Extreme Symptomatology (ES), 
Rare Combinations (RC), Unusual Hallucinations (UH), Unusual Symptom Course 
(USC), Negative Image (NI), and Suggestibility (S). Research on the ability of the M-
FAST to screen for feigning has generally been positive, with very large effect sizes and 
good negative predictive power (NPP) and sensitivity estimates (Smith, 2018). However, 
concerns have been noted regarding the over-reliance of the M-FAST on unlikely 
detection strategies with little use of amplified detection strategies (Rogers, Robinson, & 
Gillard, 2014).  
The Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology. The SIMS (Widows 
& Smith, 2005) was designed as a screening measure for feigning of both 
psychopathology and neuropsychology symptoms. In contrast to the M-FAST, the SIMS 
consists of 75 self-report, true-false items, and can be used in both clinical and forensic 
settings (Smith, 2018). The format of the SIMS scales differs from most other feigning 
measures in that the scales are organized into symptom types rather than detection 
strategies. In addition to a Total Score, this measure provides scores for Psychosis (P), 
Neurologic Impairment (NI), Amnestic Disorders (AM), Low Intelligence (LI), and 
Affective Disorders (AF) scales (Widows & Smith, 2005).  
The SIMS manual (Widows & Smith, 2005) recommends a three-level 
interpretation of the measure, in which: (1) the Total Score is used for classification of 
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suspected malingering, (2) scale scores are analyzed for qualitative data about response 
style, and (3) endorsement of individual items are used for additional information 
regarding the specific nature of the evaluee’s reported symptoms. The recommended cut-
scores for the SIMS Total Score and each SIMS scale are provided in Table 1. If an 
evaluee receives a score greater than the specified cut scores, he or she is identified as 
possibly feigning and should be referred for a full evaluation of response style.  
Table 1 
SIMS Scale Cut Scores as Recommended by the SIMS Manual 
Scale Cut Score 
Psychosis (P) > 1 
Neurological Impairment (NI) > 2 
Amnestic Disorders (AM) > 2 
Low Intelligence (LI) > 2 
Affective Disorders (AF) > 5 
Total > 14 
 
In the original cross-validation study, the SIMS Total Score was found to be the 
best predictor of feigning, with sensitivity of .96 and specificity of .88. Sensitivity rates 
for the individual scales ranged from .75 (AF) to .88 (AM), while specificity rates ranged 
from .52 (LI) to .91 (AM; Widows & Smith, 2005). Subsequent known-groups research 
on the SIMS as a screening measure of feigning has been generally positive, revealing 
very large effect sizes and good NPP and sensitivity estimates. Among eight known-
groups studies composed of forensic samples, sensitivity rates ranged from .71 to 1.00, 
NPP rates ranged from .75 to 1.00, and effect sizes ranged from d = 1.10 to 3.07 (Smith, 
2018). Indeed, in his review of this measure, Smith wrote, “The SIMS is very effective at 
retaining potential malingerers for a full assessment of malingering” (p.458).  
While the SIMS has a demonstrated strength of high sensitivity rates, some 
researchers have raised concerns regarding the potential for high rates of false positives 
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(i.e., low specificity) on this measure among clients with genuine psychopathology. The 
primary concern with low specificity values is that honest-responding evaluees will be 
falsely classified into the possibly feigning range. For example, Edens, Otto, and Dwyer 
(1999) evaluated the SIMS’ ability to detect feigned depression, psychosis, and cognitive 
impairment in a sample in which all participants responded honestly on one occasion and 
feigned symptoms on another occasion. Using the entire sample, these researchers found 
sensitivity rates for the SIMS Total Score and scale scores ranged from .68 (P) to .96 
(Total) and specificity rates ranged from .71 (LI) to .92 (N). However, moderate 
correlations were found between SIMS scores and a measure of genuine symptomatology 
(i.e., the Symptom Checklist-90-Revised), and utility estimates of participants reporting 
current clinical distress resulted in decreased specificity rates [.52 (AF) to .85 (P)]. They 
concluded, “Our findings indicate that genuinely symptomatic persons are at risk for 
being identified as malingering on the SIMS” (p. 395), particularly using the AF scale 
(Edens, Otto, & Dwyer, 1999). Similarly, Rogers, Robinson, and Gillard (2014) 
investigated the SIMS in a sample of inpatients instructed to either respond honestly or to 
exaggerate their genuine symptoms. Using the manual-recommended cut-score of > 14, 
the SIMS Total Score obtained poor specificity (.28) and misclassified over two-thirds of 
the genuine responders as feigning (PPP = .70). Rogers and colleagues therefore 
recommended a significantly higher cut-score for the SIMS Total Score (> 44), which in 
their sample resulted in sensitivity of .60 and specificity of .98. In a study composed of 
four inmate samples, classification using the SIMS Total Score (> 14) resulted in 
sensitivity of .90 for simulators and .85 for suspected malingerers, and in sensitivity of 
.97 for controls but only .40 for genuine patients (Edens, Poythress, & Watkins-Clay, 
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2007). The researchers suggested that the recommended cut-scores were less accurate in 
the classification of feigning among mental health samples compared to general 
population samples. Finally, in a recent meta-analysis of the SIMS literature, van 
Impelen, Merckelbach, Jelicic, and Merten (2014) reviewed 41 studies using the SIMS to 
screen for feigning. They found effect sizes ranging from d = 1.1 to 3.0 in known-groups 
studies and from d = 0.5 to 4.7 in simulation studies. Mean sensitivity was .97 when 
using the standard Total Score cut-score of > 14, and .90 when using a more conservative 
cut-score of > 16. Mean specificity evidenced a great deal of variability between studies, 
ranging from .37 to .70 with both Total Score cut-scores. Van Impelen and colleagues 
concluded that the SIMS contains satisfactory sensitivity but substandard specificity, a 
common weakness found in screening measures designed to maximize detection.  
Rogers, Robinson, and Gillard (2014) recently developed two additional SIMS 
scales using unlikely detection strategies. The Rare Symptoms (RS) scale includes 15 
items referring to symptoms that are endorsed frequently by feigners but infrequently by 
genuine patients. The Symptom Combinations (SC) scale includes 13 pairs of items that 
are endorsed together frequently by feigners but infrequently by genuine patients. Table 2 
includes cut-scores for these two new scales, in addition to the significantly higher Total 
Score cut-score, discussed above. In the validation of these scales, both RS and SC 
yielded very large effect sizes (d = 1.63 and d = 2.01, respectively). Using the same 
sample, the SIMS P, LI, NI, and total score yielded very large effect sizes (ranging from 
d = 1.35 to d = 1.71), but AF and AM produced smaller effect sizes (d =0.95 and d = 
1.19, respectively). The authors noted that although the results are promising for the 
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ability of the two new scales to detect feigning, additional validation is needed (Rogers, 
Robinson, & Gillard, 2014). 
Table 2 
SIMS Additional Scale Cut Scores 
Scale Cut Score 
Rare Symptoms (RS) >6 
Symptom Combinations (SC) >6 
Total >44 
 
Consistency of Feigning Measure Scores Over Time 
 Given the significant need to differentiate patients genuinely experiencing 
symptoms from those feigning symptoms, and the consequences of both false negatives 
and false positives in this decision-making process, it is imperative that evaluators have 
access to well-validated feigning instruments. While a number of assessment tools have 
been developed specifically for this purpose, little is known about how repeated 
administrations of feigning instruments may affect scores or how common it is for scores 
to change over time. Feigning is not a static attribute, so an individual who feigns 
symptoms in one setting or during one time period may respond genuinely in another 
setting or at a different time (Rogers, 2018a; Rogers, Vitacco, & Kurus, 2010). Similarly, 
an individual may feign different types of symptoms (e.g., psychosis versus cognitive 
impairment) in different situations.  
In addition to the possibility of the evaluee’s response style changing over time, 
scores on feigning instruments may be impacted by changes in genuine symptoms of 
psychopathology or by measurement error due to repeated administrations. Thus, while 
research supports the ability of many feigning instruments to detect feigning at one time 
point, we have little information about whether the instruments remain effective when 
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used again with the same patient. For example, Rogers and Bender (2003) made the 
following caution regarding repeated administrations of the SIRS:  
An important caution is that the SIRS has not been validated for repeat 
administrations, especially across brief intervals. We have observed 
several forensic cases in which in an expert, apparently dissatisfied with 
the results from an earlier expert, readministered the SIRS. One grave 
concern is whether the evaluatee had access to the results of the previous 
report (written or oral) or reasonably inferred this feedback from general 
comments made by his or her attorney. This type of specific feedback on 
past SIRS performance may invalidate subsequent administrations. (p. 
118) 
 
Rogers, Vitacco, and Kurus (2010) investigated the question of SIRS test-retest 
variability in a sample of 55 inpatients adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity 
(NGRI). The authors noted that they focused on patients genuinely experiencing 
symptoms due to the expected variability in individuals feigning symptoms. After 
screening out participants with elevated M-FAST scores, the remaining participants were 
administered the SIRS on two intervals, approximately 10 days apart. The concordance 
rate for primary scales using unlikely detection strategies was 99.5%, and the 
concordance rate for scales using amplified detection strategies was 97.6%. The overall 
SIRS classification evidenced a 100% concordance rate, as all participants met criteria to 
be classified as “genuine” on both administrations. Rogers and colleagues concluded that 
the SIRS was highly stable across repeated administrations; however, they questioned 
whether other measures of feigned psychopathology would show similar stability.  
This significance of this question is amplified when one considers the utility of 
being able to administer a brief screener rather than a full-length feigning assessment. 
Given the limited resources available in most forensic settings, it is often more practical 
to administer screening assessments. This allows the well validated but lengthy SIRS to 
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be given to only those patients who elevate screening measures of feigning. The SIMS 
has been the subject of two studies investigating this question; however, both studies 
contained significant limitations. Cima and colleagues (2003) investigated the 
psychometric properties of the German version of the SIMS. In the pilot study described 
in the article, 18 undergraduate students each completed the measure on two occasions, 
six weeks apart. All participants were instructed to respond honestly. The researchers 
found a test-retest correlation of .97, indicating excellent stability over the two 
administrations. In a similar study, Merckelbach and Smith (2003) investigated the 
psychometric properties of the Dutch version of the SIMS. Twenty-four undergraduate 
students completed the measure on two occasions, three weeks apart. Again, all 
participants were instructed to respond honestly. These researchers obtained a lower, but 
still satisfactory, test-retest correlation of .72. While these studies provided some initial 
data about repeated administrations of the SIMS, both were limited by small sample 
sizes, the reliance on undergraduate participants, and the lack of a clinical control group.  
In addition to the scarcity of research investigating repeated administrations of 
feigning screeners, there is not yet any research evaluating more than two 
administrations. Over the course of a patient or defendant’s lifespan, he or she may 
require such assessments on multiple occasions. Without data indicating the effects of 
three, four, or even more administrations of the same screening measure, clinicians 
cannot truly know whether changes in scores should be attributed to changes in response 
style, genuine symptoms, or various types of measurement error. In the field of 
neuropsychology, serial testing (i.e., repeated administrations) is often used to track 
neuropsychological impairments and strengths over time and to investigate effectiveness 
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of treatments (Heilbronner et al., 2010). Due to the frequency of this practice, the 
American Academy of Clinical Neuropsychology released an official position on serial 
neuropsychological assessments, noting a number of potential challenges raised by 
repeated administrations (Heilbronner et al., 2010). They wrote, in part:  
Neuropsychologists who conduct a re-assessment need to be mindful and 
knowledgeable about the variables potentially affecting change, including 
practice effects (i.e., gains related to prior exposure to a test), 
psychometric factors (test reliability), patient characteristics 
(demographics, state variables, fatigue, motivation) and disease state of 
the individual being assessed, and about resulting interpretive 
complications. (p. 1269) 
 
 Although feigning assessments have a different purpose than most 
neuropsychological assessments, repeated administrations of these two types of 
assessments raise many of the same concerns. Heilbronner and colleagues (2010) wrote, 
“There is an obvious need for more data on normal change trajectories for all types of 
measures with all types of demographic variables and patient groups” (p. 1274). 
Certainly, the same is true for feigning assessments.    
The Current Study 
 Feigning of mental illness is a concern in a variety of clinical settings, but 
particularly in forensic settings, in which the veracity of reported symptoms can impact 
the outcomes of legal proceedings. While several assessments tools have been developed 
and studied specifically to detect feigned and exaggerated response styles, the research on 
multiple administrations of such assessments is extremely limited. For example, only two 
studies have examined these effects for the SIMS, and both are limited in generalizability 
to clinical populations due to small samples consisting entirely of undergraduate students. 
The purpose of this dissertation was to study patterns of scores of the same feigning 
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screener administered multiple times over a 12-month period, thereby investigating the 
consistency of self-reported feigning across time. An additional area of investigation 
concerned whether changes in feigning scores were accompanied by corresponding 
changes in scores on measures of psychopathology or could be attributed to participant 
characteristics. Finally, comparisons were made between the manual-recommended cut 
score and alternative cut scores recommended in the literature, particularly between 
examinees with and without genuine mental illness.  
 This dissertation study involved secondary data analyses using the publicly 
available dataset from the study entitled, “Evaluation of the Psychological Effects of 
Administrative Segregation in Colorado, 2007-2010” (O’Keefe & Klebe, 2014). 
Participants in this study were administered numerous psychological assessments at 
baseline and again at 3, 6, 9, and 12 months after baseline. Their patterns of scores on the 
SIMS were evaluated over the five administrations in order to explore the patterns of self-
reported symptoms over time.  
 Research questions investigated in this dissertation included:  
1. How does using the SIMS manual recommended cut-score of >14 versus the 
Rogers and colleagues (2014) recommended cut-score of >44 impact which 
participants fall in the feigning range?  
a. What proportion of participants score in the feigning range at each time 
point, using each cut-score? Can participants be classified into clear 
subgroups based on their SIMS classifications over time, such as never 
feign, sometimes feign, or always feign? 
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b. How does mental health needs classification impact the proportion of 
participants who score in the feigning range? Do inmates with mental 
illness tend to receive significantly higher SIMS scores compared to 
inmates without mental illness? 
2. How much consistency is there in SIMS scores and classifications over time?  
a. What is the test-reliability of SIMS Total score and subscale scores among 
incarcerated offenders? 
b. To what extent do classifications based on an initial SIMS administration 
predict classifications on subsequent administrations?  
c. How do the SIMS subgroups (i.e., never, sometimes, or always feign) 
differ on measures of psychopathology (i.e., the PAS or BPRS)? 
3. If SIMS classifications do not show consistency over time (i.e., if participants’ 
scores vacillate between honest and feigning ranges), does this inconsistency 
correspond with: 
a. Changes in scores on measures of psychopathology (i.e., PAS or BPRS)? 
b. Other participant characteristics (i.e., administrative segregation, general 
population, or San Carlos Correctional facility; and mental health needs 
versus no mental health needs)? 
c. Regression to the mean (i.e., more extreme scores or classifications are 









 Participants were 270 male inmates incarcerated in the Colorado Prison System 
who had a hearing for administrative segregation or a diversion placement between July 
2007 and March 2009. Participants were from five subgroups within the prison system: 
inmates in administrative segregation with mental illness (n = 64), inmates in 
administrative segregation without mental illness (n = 63), inmates in general population 
with mental illness (n = 33), and inmates in general population without mental illness (n 
= 43). The fifth group consisted of inmates with mental illness placed in a mental health 
prison (San Carlos Correctional Facility) due to behavioral disruptions (n = 67). Mental 
illness classifications were based upon the existing classifications used by the prisons, 
which included diagnoses, symptoms, and resources used. Exclusionary criteria included 
scheduled release from prison prior to completion of the study, low reading ability, or an 
inability to read English. Participants were also selected based on timing or location to 
other possible participants.  
The initial screening group included 1,087 inmates; of these, 526 were excluded 
based on the exclusionary criteria. Of the 561 eligible inmates, 302 were approached for 
study participation and 270 inmates consented to participate and completed the baseline 
(Time 1) assessments. Of the original 270 participants, 261 completed Time 2 (3 
months), 253 completed Time 3 (6 months), 243 completed Time 4 (9 months), and 236 
completed Time 5 (12 months). In addition, 106 participants from the administrative 
segregation subgroups completed a sixth testing session due to delays caused by the 
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waitlist for administrative segregation beds, during which they were held in a punitive 
segregation bed at their original facility. In both the original researchers’ study and the 
current study, testing completed at each time point was kept in chronological order, such 
that the extra time point was added to the end (i.e., Time 6) rather than the beginning. 
Data collected during Time 6 was not used in the current study due to difficulties 
comparing measures completed at different times. See Table 3 for attrition rates between 
groups at each time point.  
Table 3 
 
Attrition at Each Time Point  











AS + MI 64 62 60 60 56 51 
AS – MI 63 60 58 56 56 54 
GP + MI 33 33 32 29 29 0 
GP – MI 43 41 41 39 38 0 
SCCF  67 65 62 59 57 0 
Total 270 261 253 243 236 105 
Note. AS = Administrative segregation housing, GP = General population housing, + MI 
= with mental illness, - MI = no mental illness, SCCF = San Carlos Correctional Facility 
 
 Some participants agreed to participate, then declined to participate at one or 
more time points, but then agreed to participate at later time points. Across the five time 
points, eight participants (3.0%) completed the SIMS one time, eight participants (3.0%) 
completed the SIMS two times, 11 participants (4.1%) completed the SIMS three times, 
11 participants (4.1%) completed the SIMS four times, and 232 participants (85.9%) 
completed the SIMS all five times.  
The full sample of 270 participants ranged in age from 17 to 59 (M = 31.8, SD = 
9.1). Regarding racial/ethnic backgrounds, 40% of the sample was Caucasian, 36% 
Hispanic/Latino, 18% African-American, 4% Native American, and 1% Asian. Among 
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the participants who were classified as having mental health needs, 56% were diagnosed 
with a serious and pervasive mental illness.  
Procedures  
The data for the study were initially collected as part of a larger study entitled, 
“Evaluation of the Psychological Effects of Administrative Segregation in Colorado, 
2007-2010” (O’Keefe & Klebe, 2014). Prior to participation, the field researcher met 
individually with each inmate to explain the purpose, voluntary nature, risks, benefits, 
and compensation for the study, and to obtain informed consent. Participants received 
$10.00 compensation for participation in each testing session, for a maximum of $60.00 
over the course of the study.  
At the time of consent, the participants were administered a battery of twelve self-
report psychological and cognitive assessments, as well as two prison staff-rated 
assessments of behavior and psychological functioning. Most of the assessments were re-
administered every three months after baseline, resulting in follow-up testing sessions at 
3, 6, 9, and 12 months. As detailed above, some participants completed a sixth testing 
session; however, this data were not used in the current study. Measures assessing traits 
of personality disorders, self-harm behaviors, and history of traumatic events were not re-
administered due to the relative stability of these constructs.  
Measures 
 Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS). The SIMS 
(Widows & Smith, 2005) is a screening measure of feigned psychopathological and 
neuropsychological symptoms. The measure consists of 75 true-false items and provides 
a Total Score as well as scores for Psychosis (P), Neurologic Impairment (NI), Amnestic 
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Disorders (AM), Low Intelligence (LI), and Affective Disorders (AF) scales. Two 
additional scales, Rare Symptoms (RS) and Symptom Combinations (SC), were 
developed by Rogers, Robinson, and Gillard (2014) in an effort to use the SIMS to screen 
for feigning using unlikely detection strategies.  
The original researchers of this study provided item-level SIMS data for at all five 
time points. The current study calculated and used the SIMS Total Score, five scale 
scores, and two additional scale scores at each time point. The SIMS manual (Widows & 
Smith, 2005) provides cut-scores to suggest malingering for each of these scales. 
Consistent with the manual, this study used cut-scores of > 14 for the Total Score, > 1 for 
the P scale, > 2 for the NI, AM, and LI scales, and > 5 for the AF scale. For the two 
additional scales, this study used cut-scores of > 6 for both RS and SC, as recommended 
by Rogers and colleagues (2014). Finally, this study investigated the higher Total Score 
cut-score of > 44 recommended by Rogers and colleagues.  
Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale- Expanded Version (BPRS-E). The BPRS-E 
(Ventura, Lukoff, Nuechterlein, Liberman, Green, & Shaner, 1993) is an expanded 
version of the original BPRS (Overall & Gorham, 1962; Overall & Klett, 1972), a 
measure designed to rapidly assess changes in psychiatric symptoms among inpatient 
populations. The BPRS-E consists of 24 items organized into a semi-structured interview, 
assessing a variety of affective and psychotic symptoms. Eleven items are clinician-rated 
based on the individual’s responses to interview (i.e., somatic concern, anxiety, 
depression, suicidality, guilt, hostility, grandiosity, suspiciousness, hallucinations, 
unusual thought content, and disorientation), three items are based on both the patient’s 
responses and clinician observations during the interview (i.e., elevated mood, bizarre 
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behavior, and self-neglect), and ten items are based entirely on clinician observations 
(conceptual disorganizations, blunted affect, emotional withdrawal, motor retardation, 
tension, uncooperativeness, excitement, distractibility, motor hyperactivity, and 
mannerisms and posturing). Each item is rated on a scale from 1 “not present” to 7 
“extremely severe,” resulting in Total Scores ranging from 24 to 168.  
The factor analytic structure of the BPRS has been widely studied, with most 
studies reporting a four or five factor solution in clinical patient populations. Burlingame 
and colleagues (2006) reported the most common factor components of the BPRS-E to be 
thought disturbance/positive symptoms, anxiety/depression, withdrawal/negative 
symptoms, hostile suspicious/paranoid, and activity/mania. A recent meta-analysis of 
BPRS-E factor analytic studies found four components to be most common: affect (i.e., 
depression, anxiety, guilt, suicidality), positive symptoms (i.e., hallucinations, unusual 
thought content, grandiosity, suspiciousness), negative symptoms (i.e., blunted affect, 
withdrawal, motor retardation), and activation (i.e., excitement, elevated mood, 
hyperactivity, distractibility; Dazzi, Shafer, & Lauriola, 2016). The researchers also noted 
that a fifth factor of disorganization (i.e., disorganization, disorientation, mannerisms, 
self-neglect) was not statistically supported but was present in some analyses studied.  
The original researchers provided item-level BPRS data and Total Scores at Time 
1, Time 3, and Time 5. In addition, the dataset included scores at each of these same time 
points for a Withdrawal composite, Anxious-Depressed composite, Activation/Activity 
composite, Thought Disorders composite, and Hostility-Suspiciousness composite. The 
current study used the BRPS Total Score at each time point available, as well as the 
Thought Disorders and Anxious-Depressed composite scores. These two composites 
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were chosen due to their relevance in symptoms to the Psychosis and Affective Disorders 
subscales on the SIMS.   
Personality Assessment Screener (PAS).  The PAS (Morey, 1997) is a self-report 
screening version of the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey, 1991, 2007), 
designed to evaluate the need for a full evaluation and to target particular areas of clinical 
interest. The 22 PAS items consist of the 22 PAI items found to be most sensitive to 
clinical problems. These items are organized into a Total Score and 10 clinical problem 
domains, including Negative Affect, Acting Out, Health Problems, Psychotic Features, 
Social Withdrawal, Hostile Control, Suicidal Thinking, Alienation, Alcohol Problem, and 
Anger Control. Items are rated on a 4-point scale from 0 “false, not at all true” to 3 “very 
true,” resulting in Total Scores ranging from 0 to 66. In addition to raw scores, the 
measure provides probability (p) values, which indicate the probability that the examinee 
would obtain a clinically significant score (i.e., T ≥ 70) on the full PAI.  
Research examining the utility of the PAS in screening for emotional and 
behavioral dysfunction has generally been positive, although the recommended cut-scores 
for interpretation are still debated. In one study, researchers investigated the predictive 
accuracy of the PAS Total Score in the identification of PAI profiles with at least one 
clinically significant scale elevation among of male and female participants either 
incarcerated or receiving court-mandated substance abuse treatment (Kelley, Edens, & 
Douglas, 2018). They obtained AUC values of .88 (SE = .01) using community norms 
and .83 (SE = .01) using correctional norms. Kelley and colleagues also suggested using a 
PAS Total score cut-score of ≥ 29 (rather than the manual-recommended cut-score of ≥ 
19) to increase specificity, as 92% of the sample scored greater than 19 using community 
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norms and 51% scored greater using correctional norms (Kelley, Edens, & Douglas, 
2018). Another study of the PAS’ predictive accuracy in identifying PAI elevations was 
composed of three male correctional samples (Edens, Penson, Smith, & Ruchensky, 
2018). Similar to the prior study, the combined samples obtained AUC values of .85 (SE 
= .02) using community norms and .81 (SE = .02) using correctional norms. The manual 
recommended cut-score of ≥ 19 resulted in sensitivity of .89 and specificity of .37, while 
a more conservative cut-score of ≥ 29 resulted in lower sensitivity (.60) but higher 
specificity (.92; Edens et al., 2018). The PAS has also evidenced utility in screening for 
psychological dysfunction in a variety of non-offender samples, such as with veterans 
(Creech et al., 2010), in urban primary care settings (Porcerelli et al, 2012), and with 
individuals exposed to childhood abuse and/or intimate partner violence (Porcerelli et al., 
2015). 
The original researchers provided item-level PAS data at all five time points. The 
current study calculated and used the PAS Total Score at each time point available, as 
well as the Psychotic Features and Negative Affect scores. These two clinical problem 
domains were chosen due to their relevance in symptoms to the Psychosis and Affective 





Research Question 1a 
 For my investigation of the two recommended SIMS cut-scores (i.e., > 14 versus 
> 44), I began by calculating the number of inmates who scored in the feigning range for 
each of the five time points using each cut-score. As can be seen in Table 4, the cut-score 
of > 14 resulted in 35.2% to 44.4% of examinees scoring in the feigning range, while the 
cut-score of > 44 resulted in 0.7% to 3.1% of examinees scoring in the feigning range at 
each time point.  
Table 4 
 
Number of Participants in Feigning Range at Each Time Point 
Cut Score Time 1 N = 270 
Time 2 
N = 261 
Time 3 
N = 250 
Time 4 
N = 243 
Time 5 
N = 236 
SIMS Total > 14 120 (44.4%) 105 (40.2%) 103 (41.2%) 100 (41.2%) 83 (35.2%) 
SIMS Total > 44 2 (0.7%) 8 (3.1%) 5 (2.0%) 7 (2.9%) 6 (2.5%) 
 
For each recommended SIMS cut score, I sorted participants into one of three 
feigning subgroups (Never Feigned, Sometimes Feigned, Always Feigned) based on the 
proportion of times they scored in the feigning range across administrations (see Table 5). 
Using a cut score of > 14, 41.5% were placed in the Never Feigning category, 36.3% 
were placed in the Sometimes Feigning category, and 22.2% were placed in the Always 
Feigning category. Thus, using a cut score of > 14, 58.5% of the participants were 
classified as feigning on at least one occasion. Using a cut score of > 44, 95.6% were 
placed in the Never Feigning category, 4.1% were placed in the Sometimes Feigning 
category, and 0.4% were placed in the Always Feigning category. Thus, using a cut score 





Feigning Groups Based on Proportion of Times in Feigning Range (N = 270) 
Cut Score Never Sometimes Always  
SIMS Total > 14 112 (41.5%) 98 (36.3%) 60 (22.2%) 
SIMS Total > 44 258 (95.6%) 11 (4.1%) 1 (0.4%) 
 
Research Question 1b 
I next investigated the two recommended cut-scores separately for individuals 
with and without a documented mental illness, all without any known reason to feign 
when completing the study’s measures (see Tables 6-9). Using a cut-score of > 14, 75.5% 
of inmates with mental illness scored in the feigning range at least once, and 34.2% 
scored in the feigning range across all five administrations. For inmates without mental 
illness, 35.7% scored in the feigning range at least once, and 6.1% scored in the feigning 
range across all administrations. In other words, the odds of a person with mental illness 
scoring in the feigning range at least once were 5.56 times the odds of a participant 
without mental illness scoring in the feigning range at least once, a large (OR = 5.56, 
95% CI [3.28, 9.43]) and statistically significant difference, χ2 (N = 270) = 43.15, p < 
.001.   
Using a cut-score of > 44, only 6.4% of inmates with mental illness scored in the 
feigning range on at least one occasion, and only 0.6% scored in the feigning range 
across all five administrations. For inmates without mental illness, 1.7% scored in the 
feigning range at least once, and 0.0% scored in the feigning range across all 
administrations. Tables 6 through 9 provide the specific proportions and numbers of 
participants for inmates with and without mental illness. With this cut score, the odds of a 
person with mental illness scoring in the feigning range at least once were 3.90 times the 
odds of a participant without mental illness scoring in the feigning range at least once, a 
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medium (OR = 3.90, 95% CI [0.84, 18.14]) but non-significant difference, χ2 (N = 270) = 
3.45, p = .06.   
Table 6 
 
MI Group: Number of Participants in Feigning Range at Each Time Point 
Cut Score Time 1 N = 155 
Time 2 
N = 151 
Time 3 
N = 144 
Time 4 
N = 139 
Time 5 
N = 134 
SIMS Total > 14 94 (60.6%) 86 (57.0%) 84 (58.3%) 79 (56.8%) 66 (49.3%) 




MI Group: Proportion of Times in Feigning Range (n = 155) 
Cut Score Never  Sometimes Always  
SIMS Total > 14 38 (24.5%) 64 (41.3%) 53 (34.2%) 




No MI Group: Number of Participants in Feigning Range at Each Time Point 
Cut Score Time 1 N = 115 
Time 2 
N = 110 
Time 3 
N = 106 
Time 4 
N = 104 
Time 5 
N = 102 
SIMS Total > 14 26 (22.6%) 19 (17.3%) 19 (17.9%) 21 (20.2%) 17 (16.7%) 




No MI Group: Proportion of Times in Feigning Range (n = 115) 
Cut Score Never  Sometimes Always  
SIMS Total > 14 74 (64.3%) 34 (29.6%) 7 (6.1%) 
SIMS Total > 44 113 (98.3%) 2 (1.7%) 0 (0.0%) 
 
 I used independent samples t-tests to compare mean SIMS Total Scores for 
inmates with and without mental illness. At all time points, inmates with mental illness 
received significantly higher mean Total Scores compared to inmates without mental 
illness (t (268) = 8.82, d = 1.08; t (259) = 7.09, d = 0.89; t (248) = 7.98, d = 1.02; t (241) 
= 6.52, d = 0.84; and t (234) = 6.35, d = 0.83, respectively; p < .001 for all). Mean scores 
for the no mental illness group ranged from 9.49 to 10.23 (SD = 5.53 to 7.46); mean 
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scores for the mental illness group ranged from 17.79 to 19.94 (SD = 10.75 to 12.20). 
Table 10 contains means and standard deviations for each of these groups, across the five 
time points.  
Table 10  
 
Comparing Mean SIMS Total Scores for Participants with and without Mental Illness 
Group Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4 Time 5 
Mental Illness 











No Mental Illness  











Note. Numbers indicate M (SD) 
 
 Given the discrepancy in SIMS scores found between participants with and 
without mental health needs, I calculated correlations between SIMS scores and 
PAS/BPRS scores at each time point. As can be seen in Table 11, SIMS Total Scores 
significantly correlated with PAS Total Scores and BPRS Total Scores at all time points, 
with generally moderate-sized correlations.  
Table 11 
 
Correlations between SIMS Total Scores and Scores on Measures of Psychopathology 
Time Point PAS Total Score BPRS Total Score 
Baseline/Time 1 .50** .40** 
Time 2 .43** -- 
Time 3 .55** .47** 
Time 4 .47** -- 
Time 5 .45** .31** 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01 
Research Question 2a 
Next, I investigated test-retest reliability of SIMS scores for the sample as a 
whole, examining Pearson correlations between SIMS Total Scores at all combinations of 
time points. As seen in Table 12, correlations ranged from r = .61 (Time 1 - Time 5) to r 
= .83 (Time 3 - Time 5), suggesting moderate to high reliability. I also calculated Pearson 
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correlations between scores for each SIMS scale at all combinations of time points (see 
Tables 13 - 19). Correlations for NI ranged from r = .57 to .81, AF from r = .49 to .68, P 
from r = .52 to .82, LI from r = .60 to .74, AM from r = .55 to .75, RS from r = .55 to .76, 
and SC from r = .41 to .57. Thus, most SIMS scales were comparable in reliability, with 




Test-Retest Reliability of the SIMS Total Score: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
    Correlations 
Time Point N M SD Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4 Time 5 
Baseline/Time 1 270 15.80 10.15 1.00     
Time 2 261 15.33 11.31 .70** 1.00    
Time 3 250 15.38 10.89 .71** .79** 1.00   
Time 4 243 15.17 11.17 .63** .72** .82** 1.00  
Time 5 236 14.20 10.74 .61** .68** .83** .79** 1.00 




Test-Retest Reliability of the SIMS NI Scale: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
    Correlations 
Time Point N M SD Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4 Time 5 
Baseline/Time 1 270 2.96 2.71 1.00     
Time 2 261 2.81 3.00 .64** 1.00    
Time 3 250 2.79 2.85 .57** .66** 1.00   
Time 4 243 2.78 2.94 .59** .64** .78** 1.00  
Time 5 236 2.58 2.95 .59** .59** .81** .75** 1.00 





Test-Retest Reliability of the SIMS AF Scale: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
    Correlations 
Time Point N M SD Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4 Time 5 
Baseline/Time 1 270 5.47 2.56 1.00     
Time 2 261 5.35 2.78 .57** 1.00    
Time 3 251 5.62 2.70 .55** .65** 1.00   
Time 4 243 5.45 2.64 .49** .62** .66** 1.00  
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Time 5 236 5.28 2.50 .53** .58** .68** .65** 1.00 




Test-Retest Reliability of the SIMS P Scale: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
    Correlations 
Time Point N M SD Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4 Time 5 
Baseline/Time 1 270 2.36 3.09 1.00     
Time 2 261 2.10 2.93 .66** 1.00    
Time 3 250 2.08 2.84 .67** .76** 1.00   
Time 4 243 2.10 3.03 .59** .66** .82** 1.00  
Time 5 236 1.82 2.86 .52** .61** .77** .76** 1.00 




Test-Retest Reliability of the SIMS LI Scale: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
    Correlations 
Time Point N M SD Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4 Time 5 
Baseline/Time 1 270 2.44 1.89 1.00     
Time 2 261 2.37 1.93 .61** 1.00    
Time 3 251 2.43 2.11 .62** .66** 1.00   
Time 4 243 2.32 2.09 .60** .64** .71** 1.00  
Time 5 236 2.34 2.04 .61** .67** .66** .74** 1.00 




Test-Retest Reliability of the SIMS AM Scale: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
    Correlations 
Time Point N M SD Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4 Time 5 
Baseline/Time 1 270 2.57 2.90 1.00     
Time 2 261 2.70 3.28 .62** 1.00    
Time 3 251 2.45 3.14 .67** .75** 1.00   
Time 4 243 2.51 3.34 .55** .69** .76** 1.00  
Time 5 236 2.19 3.07 .57** .66** .77** .74** 1.00 




Test-Retest Reliability of the SIMS RS Scale: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
    Correlations 
Time Point N M SD Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4 Time 5 
Baseline/Time 1 270 1.63 1.90 1.00     
Time 2 261 1.46 1.91 .63** 1.00    
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Time 3 249 1.56 2.07 .67** .76** 1.00   
Time 4 243 1.48 2.04 .55** .65** .74** 1.00  
Time 5 236 1.48 1.82 .61** .65** .70** .69** 1.00 




Test-Retest Reliability of the SIMS SC Scale: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
    Correlations 
Time Point N M SD Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4 Time 5 
Baseline/Time 1 270 3.92 2.44 1.00     
Time 2 261 3.44 2.18 .45** 1.00    
Time 3 246 3.33 2.21 .52** .50** 1.00   
Time 4 243 3.18 2.09 .41** .57** .55** 1.00  
Time 5 236 3.15 2.20 .43** .47** .48** .56** 1.00 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
Research Question 2b 
 I used classification accuracy statistics (i.e., sensitivity, specificity, positive 
predictive power (PPP), negative predictive power (NPP), and overall accuracy) to 
examine the consistency of SIMS classifications across time. Two sets of analyses were 
included, the first focusing on changes between the baseline administration and 
subsequent administrations, and the second focusing on changes between consecutive 
administrations. It should be noted that in this paper, classification accuracy statistics 
were used somewhat differently than in most malingering research. Rather than using a 
test to predict a known group (i.e., using the SIMS feigning classification to predict true 
malingering/honest status), these statistics used the SIMS classification at Time 1 to 
predict the SIMS classification at a later time point. Using the Time 1-Time 2 comparison 
as an example, sensitivity in this context indicates the probability that participants 
feigned at Time 1 when they feigned at Time 2 (i.e., true positive rate), specificity 
indicates the probability that participants did not feign at Time 1 when they did not feign 
at Time 2 (i.e., true negative rate), PPP indicates the probability that participants feigned 
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at Time 2 when they feigned at Time 1, NPP indicates the probability that participants did 
not feign at Time 2 when they did not feign at Time 1, and accuracy indicates the overall 
probability that participants were correctly classified at Time 1 using Time 2 as the 
criterion.  
For the first set of analyses, classification accuracy statistics were calculated for 
the ability of the baseline SIMS classification to predict classifications on subsequent 
administrations (i.e., Time 1 vs. Time 2, Time 1 vs. Time 3, Time 1 vs. Time 4, Time 1 
vs. Time 5). Table 20 contains the cell counts for each of these classification 
comparisons, while Table 21 contains classification accuracy statistics. Sensitivity rates 
ranged from 77.11% to 81.55%, specificity rates from 73.86% to 79.59%, PPP from 
61.54% to 73.86%, NPP from 84.33% to 86.03%, and overall accuracy rates from 
75.00% to 80.40%. McNemar’s test indicated the proportion of participants who scored 
in the feigning range at Time 1 and the proportion who scored in the feigning range at 
Time 2 were not significantly different (p = .10, OR = 1.65, 95% CI [0.95, 2.88]). 
Additional McNemar’s tests revealed nonsignificant differences between Time 1 and 
Time 3 (p = .15, OR = 1.58, 95% CI [0.89, 2.81]), and Time 1 and Time 4 (p = .26, OR = 
1.50, 95% CI [0.82, 2.50]); however, the proportions of participants who scored in the 
feigning range at Time 1 and Time 5 were significantly different (p < .01, OR = 2.11, 
95% CI [1.22, 3.63]). This suggests that the proportions of participants who score in the 
feigning range at two different time points are more likely to be significantly different 







Cell Counts for Ability of Time 1 Classification to Predict Subsequent Classifications 
Time 1  Time 2   Time 3  Time 4  Time 5 Feign Honest  Feign Honest  Feign Honest  Feign Honest 
Feign 85 33  84 30  79 30  64 40 





















































































Note. CI = 95% confidence interval. 
 
For the second set of analyses, classification accuracy statistics were calculated 
for the ability of each SIMS administration to predict classifications on each consecutive 
administration (i.e., Time 1 vs. Time 2, Time 2 vs. Time 3, Time 3 vs. Time 4, Time 4 vs. 
Time 5). Table 22 contains the cell counts for each of these classification comparisons, 
while Table 23 contains classification accuracy statistics. Sensitivity rates ranged from 
80.39% to 84.34%, specificity rates from 78.85% to 87.07%, PPP from 72.03% to 
81.19%, NPP from 86.01% to 90.78%, and accuracy rates from 79.69% to 84.34%. 
McNemar’s tests revealed nonsignificant differences between the proportions of 
participants who scored in the feigning range at Time 1 and Time 2 (p = .10, OR = 1.65, 
95% CI [0.95, 2.88]), Time 2 and Time 3 (p = 1.00, OR = 1.05, 95% CI [0.56, 1.97]), 
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Time 3 and Time 4 (p = .87, OR = 1.11, 95% CI [0.59, 2.20]), and Time 4 and Time 5 (p 
= .73, OR = 1.92, 95% CI [0.98, 3.76]). These results suggest that similar proportions of 




Cell Counts for Ability of Each Classification to Predict the Consecutive Classification 
 Time 2   Time 3  Time 4  Time 5 Feign Honest  Feign Honest  Feign Honest  Feign Honest 
Time 1            
Feign 85 33  - -  - -  - - 
Honest 20 123  - -  - -  - - 
Time 2            
Feign - -  82 19  - -  - - 
Honest - -  20 128  - -  - - 
Time 3            
Feign - -  - -  80 20  - - 
Honest - -  - -  18 121  - - 
Time 4            
Feign - -  - -  - -  70 25 



























































































Research Question 2c 
I next used six mixed-model repeated measures MANOVAs to compare the three 
subgroups of inmates (i.e., Never, Sometimes, or Always Feigning using the >14 SIMS 
cut-score) on measures of psychopathology (i.e., PAS and BPRS) across the five time 
points. For all analyses, feigning group served as the between-subjects independent 
variable and time point served as the within-subjects independent variable. Dependent 
variables were the various PAS and BRPS scale scores at each time point. PAS analyses 
included all five time points, while BRPS analyses included the three time points 
available (i.e., Time 1, Time 3, and Time 5).  Table 24 contains descriptive statistics for 
all MANOVAs.  
Table 24 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Measures of Psychopathology by Feigning Group 








Time 5  
M (SD) 
PAS Total Score      
     Never (n = 84) 25.51 (7.44) 24.64 (8.12) 24.23 (7.96) 23.83 (7.53) 24.33 (7.88) 
     Sometimes (n = 81) 32.36 (8.97) 31.02 (8.51) 30.23 (7.40) 30.14 (8.86) 29.63 (7.85) 
     Always (n = 43) 35.49 (9.46) 35.40 (9.17) 36.12 (8.02) 35.00 (8.26) 34.23 (9.47) 
     Total (n = 208) 30.24 (9.38) 29.35 (9.44) 29.02 (8.95) 28.60 (9.25) 28.44 (9.01) 
PAS Psychotic Features      
     Never (n = 92) 1.21 (1.36) 1.00 (1.21) 1.11 (1.31) 1.09 (1.18) 1.00 (1.13) 
     Sometimes (n = 88) 1.98 (1.71) 1.64 (1.58) 1.76 (1.72) 1.69 (1.71) 1.82 (1.84) 
     Always (n = 48) 2.25 (1.79) 2.46 (1.98) 2.63 (1.62) 2.31 (1.80) 2.54 (1.77) 
     Total (n = 228) 1.55 (1.63) 1.55 (1.63) 1.68 (1.64) 1.58 (1.60) 1.64 (1.68) 
PAS Negative Affect      
     Never (n = 90) 3.24 (1.97) 3.23 (2.02) 2.99 (1.83) 2.97 (1.88) 2.88 (1.77) 
     Sometimes (n = 86) 4.90 (2.30) 4.10 (2.03) 3.91 (1.99) 4.17 (2.22) 4.01 (2.10) 
     Always (n = 46) 5.09 (2.19) 5.33 (2.26) 5.54 (2.11) 5.50 (2.24) 5.22 (2.33) 
     Total (n = 222) 4.27 (2.30) 4.00 (2.21) 3.87 (2.16) 3.96 (2.29) 3.80 (2.20) 
BRPS Total Score      
     Never (n = 71) 30.41 (6.47) - 28.72 (6.49) - 28.70 (5.67) 
     Sometimes (n = 76) 36.11 (9.30) - 31.68 (5.25) - 31.49 (6.02) 
     Always (n = 42) 37.33 (8.10) - 36.71 (7.39) - 34.64 (6.49) 
     Total (n = 189) 34.24 (8.57) - 31.69 (6.90) - 31.14 (6.37) 
BPRS Anxious-Depres.      
     Never (n = 71) 7.72 (2.34) - 7.15 (2.57) - 7.13 (2.60) 
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     Sometimes (n = 76) 9.34 (3.31) - 8.14 (2.55) - 8.08 (2.48) 
     Always (n = 41) 10.37 (3.36) - 9.78 (2.41) - 9.73 (3.52) 
     Total (n = 188) 8.95 (3.15) - 8.13 (2.70) - 8.08 (2.93) 
BPRS Thought Disord.      
     Never (n = 71) 5.54 (1.29) - 5.35 (1.08) - 5.41 (1.32) 
     Sometimes (n = 76) 7.01 (3.11) - 5.79 (1.34) - 6.11 (2.16) 
     Always (n = 41) 7.61 (2.87) - 7.12 (2.04) - 6.51 (1.91) 
     Total (n = 188) 6.59 (2.64) - 5.91 (1.58) - 5.93 (1.87) 
Note. PAS = Personality Assessment Screener, BRPS = Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale. 
Some cases were not included due to listwise deletion of missing data. BPRS data was 
only available at time points 1, 3, and 5.  
 
For the first MANOVA, the PAS Total Scores at Times 1 through 5 served as the 
dependent variables. There were significant main effects for time point (F (4, 202) = 
2.57, p = .04, Wilk’s Λ = 0.95, partial η2 = .05) and feigning group (F (2, 205) = 35.24, p 
< .001, partial η2 = .26). The time point/feigning group interaction effect was not 
significant (F (8, 404) = 0.85, p = .56, Wilk’s Λ = 0.97, partial η2 = .02). For the time 
point main effect, pairwise comparisons indicated that the only significant difference was 
between Time 1 and Time 5 (p = .02). Participants received higher scores at Time 1 (M = 
30.24, SD = 9.38) compared to Time 5 (M = 28.44, SD = 9.01). For the feigning group 
main effect, a Tukey post hoc test revealed that the mean PAS Total Scores in the Never 
group were significantly lower than both the Sometimes (p < .001) and Always (p < .001) 
groups, and the Sometimes group scored significantly lower than the Always group (p < 
.01). 
For the second MANOVA, the PAS Psychotic Features subscale scores at Times 
1 through 5 served as the dependent variables. There was a significant main effect for 
feigning group (F (2, 225) = 20.71, p < .001, partial η2 = .16), but the main effect for time 
point was not significant (F (4, 222) = 0.95, p = .44, Wilk’s Λ = 0.98, partial η2 = .02). 
The interaction effect was also not significant (F (8, 444) = 0.85, p = .56, Wilk’s Λ = 
0.97, partial η2 = .02). For the feigning group main effect, a Tukey post hoc test revealed 
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that the mean PAS Total Scores in the Never group were significantly lower than both the 
Sometimes (p < .001) and Always (p < .001) groups, and the Sometimes group scored 
significantly lower than the Always group (p < .01). 
For the third MANOVA, the PAS Negative Affect subscale scores at Times 1 
through 5 served as the dependent variables. There was a significant main effect for 
feigning group (F (2, 219) = 29.35, p < .001, partial η2 = .21), but the main effect for time 
point was not significant (F (4, 216) = 1.76, p = .14, Wilk’s Λ = 0.97, partial η2 = .03). In 
this analysis, the interaction effect was statistically significant (F (8, 432) = 2.51, p = .01, 
Wilk’s Λ = 0.91, partial η2 = .04). This interaction effect can be seen visually in Figure 1. 
For the feigning group main effect, a Tukey post hoc test revealed that the mean PAS 
Total Scores in the Never group were significantly lower than both the Sometimes (p < 
.001) and Always (p < .001) groups, and the Sometimes group scored significantly lower 
than the Always group (p = .001). To better understand the significant interaction effect, 
independent-samples t-tests were conducted comparing each feigning group mean PAS 
Negative Affect score at each time point. As can be seen in Table 25, all of these t-tests 
were significant except for the Sometimes-Always comparison at Time 1. Of note, when 
a Bonferroni correction was applied to counteract the problem of multiple comparisons, 
the overall p-value of .05 became .004; the same comparisons remained significant. 
Cohen’s d for the significant comparisons ranged from 0.46 to 1.34, indicating medium to 








Independent Samples T-Tests for PAS Negative Affect 
Test Time Point Groups  n M SD t df p d 






2.23 -5.87 207 < .001*** -0.84 






2.32 -5.88 169 < .001*** -0.99 






2.32 -0.76 156 .445 -0.12 






2.08 -3.21 196 .002** -0.46 






2.30 -6.25 160 < .001*** -1.03 






2.30 -3.45 150 .001** -0.58 






2.05 -3.91 192 < .001*** -0.56 






2.22 -7.91 152 < .001*** -1.33 






2.22 -4.36 148 < .001*** -0.74 













































2.20 -7.73 144 < .001*** -1.34 






2.20 -3.63 142 < .001*** -0.63 






2.10 -4.78 185 < .001*** -0.70 






2.36 -7.27 142 < .001*** -1.28 






2.36 -3.08 139 .002** -0.55 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Bonferroni correction requires .004 for 
statistical significance.  
 
For the fourth MANOVA, the BPRS Total Scores at Times 1, 3, and 5 served as 
the dependent variables. There were significant main effects for time point (F (2, 185) = 
10.28, p < .001, Wilk’s Λ = 0.90, partial η2 = .10) and feigning group (F (2, 186) = 27.07, 
p < .001, partial η2 = .23). The interaction effect was not significant (F (4, 370) = 2.12, p 
= .08, Wilk’s Λ = 0.96, partial η2 = .02). For the time point main effect, pairwise 
comparisons indicated that there were significant differences between Time 1 (M = 34.24, 
SD = 8.57) and Time 3 (M = 31.69, SD = 6.90, p < .01) and between Time 1 and Time 5 
(M = 31.14, SD = 6.37, p < .001), but not between Time 3 and Time 5 (p = .39). For the 
feigning group main effect, a Tukey post hoc test revealed that the mean PAS Total 
Scores in the Never group were significantly lower than both the Sometimes (p < .001) 
and Always (p < .001) groups, and the Sometimes group scored significantly lower than 
the Always group (p < .01). 
For the fifth MANOVA, the BPRS Anxious-Depressed composite scores at Times 
1, 3, and 5 served as the dependent variables. There were significant main effects for time 
point (F (2, 184) = 6.27, p < .01, Wilk’s Λ = 0.94, partial η2 = .06) and feigning group (F 
(2, 185) = 21.74, p < .001, partial η2 = .19). The interaction effect was not significant (F 
(4, 368) = 0.52, p = .72, Wilk’s Λ = 0.99, partial η2 = .01). For the time point main effect, 
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pairwise comparisons indicated that there were significant differences between Time 1 
(M = 8.95, SD = 3.15) and Time 3 (M = 8.13, SD = 2.70, p < .01) and between Time 1 
and Time 5 (M = 8.08, SD = 2.93, p < .01), but not between Time 3 and Time 5 (p = 
1.00). For the feigning group main effect, a Tukey post hoc test revealed that the mean 
PAS Total Scores in the Never group were significantly lower than both the Sometimes 
(p < .01) and Always (p < .001) groups, and the Sometimes group scored significantly 
lower than the Always group (p = .001). 
For the sixth MANOVA, the BPRS Thought Disorders composite scores at Times 
1, 3, and 5 served as the dependent variables. There were significant main effects for time 
point (F (2, 184) = 6.24, p < .01, Wilk’s Λ = 0.94, partial η2 = .06) and feigning group (F 
(2, 185) = 17.54, p < .001, partial η2 = .16). The interaction effect was also statistically 
significant (F (4, 368) = 3.73, p < .01, Wilk’s Λ = 0.92, partial η2 = .04). This interaction 
effect can be seen visually in Figure 2, in which the mean scores for the three feigning 
groups become closer over time. For the time point main effect, pairwise comparisons 
indicated that there were significant differences between Time 1 (M = 6.59, SD = 2.64) 
and Time 3 (M = 5.91, SD = 1.58, p < .01) and between Time 1 and Time 5 (M = 5.93, 
SD = 1.87, p < .01), but not between Time 3 and Time 5 (p = 1.00). For the feigning 
group main effect, a Tukey post hoc test revealed that the mean PAS Total Scores in the 
Never group were significantly lower than both the Sometimes (p = .001) and Always (p 
< .001) groups, and the Sometimes group scored significantly lower than the Always 
group (p = .017). To better understand the significant interaction effect, independent-
samples t-tests were conducted comparing each feigning group mean BPRS Thought 
Disorders score at each time point. As can be seen in Table 26, most of these t-tests were 
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significant, with only the Time 1 Sometimes-Always, Time 3 Never-Sometimes, and 
Time 5 Sometimes-Always comparisons being non-significant. Of note, when a 
Bonferroni correction was applied to counteract the problem of multiple comparisons, the 
overall p-value of .05 became .006; the Time 5 Never-Sometimes comparison became 
non-significant. Cohen’s d for the significant comparisons ranged from 0.42 to 0.98, with 
most effect sizes falling in the medium range. 
 




Independent Samples T-Tests for BPRS Thought Disorders 
Test Time Point Groups  n M SD t df p d 






2.87 -3.56 198 < .001*** -0.50 






2.58 -5.17 160 < .001*** -0.84 






2.58 -1.09 152 .277 -0.18 






1.34 -1.93 181 .056 -0.29 



































Always  50 6.86 1.98 






1.98 -3.92 139 < .001*** -0.69 






2.23 -2.72 160 .007** -0.42 






1.92 -3.92 123 < .001*** -0.73 






1.92 -0.86 127 .394 -0.16 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Bonferroni correction requires .006 for 
statistical significance.  
 
Research Question 3a 
I next examined the extent to which changes in SIMS scores could be explained 
by corresponding changes in self-reported or clinician-rated psychopathology. To 
maximize sample size and statistical power, I focused on changes from Time 1 to Time 3, 
the first follow-up time point for which data was available for all three measures. First, I 
used three separate bivariate linear regression models to calculate residualized change 
scores for the SIMS, PAS, and BPRS Total Scores. Each model used the Time 1 score as 
the predictor and the Time 3 score as the outcome variable. These residual values were 
saved, as they represented the proportion of the follow-up score that was not linearly 
related to the baseline score. I then used a single multiple regression model to examine 
whether changes in SIMS scores were significantly correlated with the changes in PAS or 
BPRS scores. For this model, the residualized change scores for the PAS and BPRS 
served as predictors, and the residualized change scores for the SIMS served as the 
outcome variable. 
Results indicated the PAS and BPRS residualized change scores significantly 
predicted the SIMS residualized change scores, F (2, 217) = 36.92, p < .001, R2 = .254. 
This R2 value indicates that 25.4% of the variance in the model was explained by the two 
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predictors. Individually, both the PAS residualized change scores (B = .542, β = .470, t = 
7.92, p < .001, rsp = .464) and the BPRS residualized change scores (B = .161, β = .077, t 
= 2.09, p = .04, rsp = .122) were significant predictors of SIMS residualized change 
scores. The squared semi-partial correlations for each of these predictors (r2sp = .215 and 
r2sp = .015, respectively) indicate that 21.5% of the variance in SIMS residualized change 
scores can be explained uniquely by the PAS residualized changes scores, and 1.5% can 
be explained uniquely by the BPRS residualized change scores.  
Research Question 3b  
I next examined the extent to which changes in SIMS scores could be explained 
by other participant characteristics, including housing placement (i.e., administrative 
segregation, general population, and San Carlos Correctional Facility), and mental health 
needs (i.e., needs versus no needs). To maximize sample size and statistical power, I 
focused on changes from Time 1 to Time 2. I first used a bivariate linear regression to 
calculate residualized change scores for the SIMS Total Score, using the Time 1 score as 
the predictor and the Time 2 score as the outcome variable. These residual values were 
saved, as they represented the proportion of the follow-up score that was not linearly 
related to the baseline score. I then used hierarchical regression analyses to predict SIMS 
residualized change scores using housing placement and mental health needs alternatively 
in the two steps. 
In the first model, housing placement (represented by two dummy variables) 
served as the predictor in step 1 and mental health needs (dichotomous) served as the 
predictor in step 2. In the first step, housing placement did not significantly predict the 
SIMS residualized change scores, F (2, 258) = 1.10, p = .33, R2 = .008. When mental 
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health needs was added, the model remained non-significant, F (3, 257) = 1.12, p = .34, 
R2 = .013. 
In the second model, the predictors were swapped, with mental health needs 
(dichotomous) being entered in step 1 and housing placement (represented by two 
dummy variables) in step 2. In the first step, mental health needs did not significantly 
predict the SIMS residualized changed scores, F (1, 259) = 2.63, p = .11, R2 = .010. 
When housing placement was added, the model again remained non-significant, F (3, 
257) = 1.12, p = .34, R2 = .013.  
In summary, regardless of whether housing placement or mental health needs was 
added first, these participant characteristics did not significantly explain changes in SIMS 
scores from Time 1 to Time 2.  
Research Question 3c 
 Finally, I examined whether changes in SIMS scores might be explained by 
regression toward the mean. In order to investigate this question, I computed the Pearson 
correlation of the Time 1-Time 2 score difference (absolute value) and the Time 1- mean 
Time 1 score across the sample. Results indicated a moderate-strength positive 
correlation between |Time 1-Time 2| (M = 5.61, SD = 6.27) and Time 1- mean Time 1 (M 
= 0.00, SD = 10.15), r = .40, p < .001, n = 261.  
A Galton squeeze diagram was constructed (see Figure 3) to provide a visual aid 
of this regression toward the mean. In this diagram, data points falling at 1 on the X-axis 
indicate SIMS Total Scores at Time 1, and data points falling at 2 on the X-axis indicate 
the corresponding mean SIMS Total Scores at Time 2 for each Time 1 score. As 
suggested by the positive correlation between Time 1-Time 2 and Time 1- mean Time 1, 
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there does appear to be a moderate regression toward the mean, in which the more 
extreme scores at Time 1 tend to become less extreme upon retesting.  
 
Figure 3. Galton Squeeze Diagram Showing Regression to the Mean from Time 1 to 






















The primary purposes of this dissertation were to investigate consistency and 
patterns of feigning on a self-report screening measure, and to investigate whether 
changes in scores on this measure may be attributed to changes in scores on measures of 
psychopathology and/or to participant characteristics. A number of assessment tools have 
been developed for the detection of feigned psychopathology, and an extensive body of 
literature has documented strong support for the ability of these measures to detect 
feigning. However, most studies have investigated a single administration of each 
instrument, leaving a gap in our knowledge about the psychometric properties of repeated 
administrations and about how consistent examinees tend to be in their response styles 
over time. This dissertation used a publicly available dataset from a large study of 
inmates in Colorado (O’Keefe & Klebe, 2014), during which participants were 
administered numerous psychological assessments at five time points over a 12-month 
period. For this study, their patterns of scores on the Structured Interview of Malingered 
Symptomatology (SIMS, Widows & Smith, 2005) were evaluated across five 
administrations in order to explore the patterns of self-reported symptoms over time.  
An additional research focus of this dissertation, which yielded particularly 
interesting results, was to compare the utility of two different cut-scores in examinees 
with and without genuine mental illness. Research on the SIMS as a screening measure of 
feigning has generally been positive, with very large effect sizes and good NPP and 
sensitivity estimates. However, a number of researchers have raised concerns regarding 
the potential for high rates of false positives among examinees with genuine symptoms. 
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While the SIMS manual recommends a Total Score cut-score of > 14, Rogers, Robinson, 
and Gillard (2014) recommended a significantly higher cut-score of > 44 in order to 
improve specificity of the measure. This dissertation investigated both recommended cut-
scores, comparing rates of feigning among inmates with and without existing mental 
health needs.  
Consistency in SIMS Scores and Classifications Over Time 
To investigate consistency in SIMS scores over time, I first examined Pearson 
correlations between SIMS Total Scores and scale scores at all combinations of time 
points. For the Total Score, correlations ranged from r = .61 to r = .83, suggesting 
moderate to high reliability. Most SIMS scales were comparable in reliability, with 
relative weaknesses in test-retest reliability for the Affective Disorders and Symptom 
Combinations scales.  
I used modified classification accuracy statistics (i.e., sensitivity, specificity, 
positive predictive power (PPP), negative predictive power (NPP), and overall accuracy) 
to examine the consistency of SIMS classifications across time. These statistics were 
modified such that instead of using a test to predict a known group, one SIMS 
classification was used to predict another SIMS classification at a later time point. When 
the Time 1/baseline classification was used to predict classifications at the other four time 
points, accuracy rates ranged from 75.00% to 80.40%. When the classification at each 
time point was used to predict the classification at the subsequent time point, accuracy 
rates ranged from 79.69% to 84.34%. As would be expected given the relative ease of 
predicting scores closer in time rather than farther apart; sensitivity, specificity, PPP, and 
NPP were all higher when predicting classifications using consecutive time points 
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compared to using the baseline classification to predict all other time points. McNemar’s 
tests were used to compare proportions of participants who scored in the feigning range at 
various combinations of time points. With the exception of the Time 1 – Time 5 
comparison, all results were nonsignificant, suggesting that the proportions of 
participants who score in the feigning range at two different time points are more likely 
to be significantly different when the time points are farther apart.  
 Using the manual-recommended cut-score of > 14, inmates were sorted into one 
of three feigning subgroups (Never Feign, Sometimes Feign, Always Feign) based on the 
proportion of times they scored in the feigning range across administrations. I used six 
mix-model repeated measures MANOVAs to compare these three subgroups on measures 
of psychopathology, including the Personality Assessment Screener (PAS, Morey, 1997) 
and Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS, Ventura et al., 1993). All six MANOVAs 
revealed significant main effects for feigning group, such that scores for participants in 
the Never group were significantly lower than the Sometimes and Always groups, and 
scores in the Sometimes group were significantly lower than the Always group. Thus, 
inmates whose response styles on the SIMS were sometimes or always classified as 
feigning tended to receive higher mean scores on both self-report and clinician-rated 
measures of psychopathology. Significant main effects for time point were found for the 
PAS Total Score, the BPRS Total Score, the BPRS Anxious-Depressed composite score, 
and the BPRS Thought Disorders composite score, such that scores tended to decrease 
from the baseline administration to later time points. Finally, interaction effects were 
found between feigning group and time point for the PAS Negative Affect clinical 
problem domain and the BPRS Thought Disorders composite. Independent samples t-
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tests were conducted comparing each feigning group score at each time point for these 
two subscales; most comparisons were significant with medium to large effect sizes for 
the PAS Negative Affect and medium effect sizes for the BPRS Thought Disorders.  
Other Factors Corresponding with Changes in SIMS Scores 
 Despite moderate to high SIMS reliability over time, participants’ scores tended 
to vacillate in and out of the feigning range. We examined several factors that could 
correspond with this inconsistency, including changes in scores on measures of 
psychopathology, participant characteristics, and regression to the mean.  
 I first examined the extent to which changes in SIMS scores could be explained 
by corresponding changes in self-reported or clinician-rated psychopathology. Bivariate 
linear regression models were used to calculate residualized changes scores for the SIMS, 
PAS, and BPRS Total Scores from Time 1 to Time 3 (i.e., 6-month follow-up), and these 
residuals were used in a single multiple regression model to examine whether changes in 
SIMS scores were significantly correlated with the changes in PAS or BPRS scores. 
Results indicated the PAS and BPRS residualized change scores significantly predicted 
the SIMS residualized change scores, together explaining 25.4% of the variance. Looking 
individually at each predictor, the PAS held more predictive weight, with 21.5% of the 
SIMS change variance explained uniquely by the PAS and 1.5% explained uniquely by 
the BPRS. Together, this information suggests that changes in SIMS are better predicted 
by a self-report measure of psychopathology than a clinician-rated measure. Thus, self-
report measures may be more susceptible to response style changes compared to 
clinician-rated measures.    
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I next examined the extent to which changes in SIMS scores could be explained 
by other participant characteristics, including housing placement (i.e., administrative 
segregation, general population, and San Carlos Correctional Facility), and mental health 
needs (i.e., needs versus no needs). A bivariate linear regression model was used to 
calculate residualized change scores for the SIMS Total Score from Time 1 to Time 2 
(i.e., 3-month follow-up), and then hierarchical regression analyses were used to predict 
these residuals using housing placement and mental health needs alternatively in the two 
steps. Regardless of whether housing placement or mental health needs was added first, 
these participant characteristics did not significantly explain changes in SIMS scores.  
 Next, I examined whether changes in SIMS scores might be explained by 
regression toward the mean, such that more extreme scores are closer to the mean upon 
reassessment. A Pearson correlation of the Time 1-Time 2 score difference (absolute 
value) and the Time 1- mean Time 1 score revealed a moderate-strength positive 
correlation. A Galton squeeze diagram was constructed to provide a visual aid of this 
moderate regression toward the mean, demonstrating that more extreme SIMS Total 
Scores at Time 1 tend to become less extreme upon retesting. This suggests that as 
participants complete additional administrations of the same feigning screener, extremely 
high scorers tend to endorse fewer items and extremely low scorers tend to endorse more 
items.  
SIMS Cut-Score Comparisons 
 My final research question involved comparison of two cut-scores: the SIMS 
manual recommended cut-score of > 14 and the Rogers and colleagues (2014) 
recommended cut-score of > 44. Using a cut-score of > 14, 34.2% to 44.4% of 
53 
 
participants scored in the feigning range at each time point. Using a cut-score of > 44, 
0.7% to 3.1% of participants scoring in the feigning range at each time point. Over 58% 
of the sample was classified as feigning at least once using the cut-score of > 14, whereas 
less than 5% of the sample was classified as feigning at least once using the cut-score of 
> 44.  
I next investigated the two recommended cut-scores separately for individuals 
with and without mental health needs documented by the prison. Using a cut-score of > 
14, 75.5% of inmates with mental illness scored in the feigning range at least once 
(34.2% Always) whereas for inmates without mental illness, 35.7% scored in the feigning 
range at least once (6.1% Always). The odds of a participant with mental illness scoring 
in the feigning range at least once were over five times the odds of a participant without 
mental illness. Using a cut-score of > 44, only 6.4% of inmates with mental illness scored 
in the feigning range at least once (0.6% Always), and for participants without mental 
illness, only 1.7% scored in the feigning range at least once (0.0% Always). Due to the 
small number of participants who scored in the feigning range using the higher cut score, 
this odds-ratio was non-significant.  
Finally, I used independent samples t-tests to compare mean SIMS Total Scores 
for inmates with and without mental illness. At all time points, inmates with mental 
illness received significantly higher mean Total Scores compared to inmates without 
mental illness. Mean scores for the no mental illness group ranged from 9.49 to 10.23; 
mean scores for the mental illness group ranged from 17.79 to 19.94. Pearson correlations 
between SIMS Total Scores and PAS/BPRS Total Scores revealed weak to moderate-
strength positive correlations at all time points. Together, this information questions the 
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SIMS’ ability to differentiate between genuine psychopathology and feigning response 
styles. These results are consistent with prior research findings of low SIMS specificity 
among individuals with genuine mental illness.  
The correlations between feigning scores and scores on other measures of 
psychopathology appear to be an under-researched area of the literature. The SIMS has 
been found to correlate moderately with Symptom Checklist-90-Revised global severity 
index score, with r = .52 for the SIMS Total and r ranging from .28 to .49 for the 
subscales (Edens et al., 1999). These correlations are consistent with the correlations 
found in the current study. Regarding other measures of feigned psychopathology, only 
one study could be found reporting correlations with measures of psychopathology. In a 
sample of compensation-seeking veterans (Freeman, Powell, & Kimbrell, 2008), 
significant correlations were found between SIRS Total Scores and scores on the 
Clinician Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS-2) and the Diagnostic Interview for 
Borderlines (DIB), suggesting relations between the SIRS and reports of PTSD and 
borderline personality symptoms. For the CAPS-2 total and subscale scores, correlations 
with the SIRS ranged from r = .33 to r = .45, while the correlation for the DIB total score 
was r = .51. Correlations were non-significant between SIRS scores and Combat 
Exposure Scale scores, Beck Depression Inventory scores, or self-reported substance use. 
While the correlation between the SIMS and measures of psychopathology has been 
found concerning in both the current dissertation and at least one prior study, the dearth 
of research on other feigning measures does not allow for comparisons at this time. 
Future research should examine whether other feigning measures and screeners exhibit 
this same weakness in specificity.  
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Limitations and Strengths 
 There were several limitations to this study that must be acknowledged. The first, 
and largest, limitation was the lack of known groups for feigning status. While the 
available data allowed us to investigate consistency of SIMS scores over time, to 
compare various subgroups, and to investigate correspondence with other measures, there 
was no way to know whether each participant was truly feigning or responding honestly. 
Thus, while I found associations between changes in SIMS scores and changes on 
measures of psychopathology, it is unknown whether the SIMS may falsely determine 
genuine symptoms to be evidence of feigning or whether participants who feigned on the 
SIMS also tended to endorse more symptoms on the PAS and BPRS. It would benefit 
future research to investigate these research questions using known-groups samples. 
Second, all participants were adult males with adequate reading abilities who were 
incarcerated in the Colorado Department of Corrections, so it is unknown whether results 
could be generalized to females, juveniles or the elderly, inmates unable to read and 
write, prisons in other states. Third, this study used only the SIMS to assess response 
style, so generalizations to other feigning measures and screening measures are unknown.  
 Notwithstanding these limitations, this study had several strengths. First, this was 
the first study to examine patterns of scores of a feigning screener with five 
administrations, as previous research included only two administrations. Thus, my results 
provide an important contribution to the field’s understanding of how scores on the SIMS 
may change over more than two administrations. Second, this was a relatively diverse 
sample, with approximately 60% of the sample reporting minority racial and ethnic 
backgrounds and with ages ranging from 17 to 59. Third, psychopathology was assessed 
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using multiple methods, including both a self-report measure and a clinician-rated 
instrument.  
Conclusions 
These results support concerns raised by prior researchers regarding the potential 
for false positives among examinees with genuine mental illness. The manual-
recommended cut-score of > 14 appears to be too low, as 75% of inmates with mental 
illness scored in the feigning range at least once, despite having no known reason to feign 
symptoms. If the majority of individuals with genuine mental illness score above the 
feigning cut-score, the screener may actually be capturing changes in symptomatology 
rather than changes in response style. At the same time, the > 44 cut-score recommended 
by Rogers and colleagues is likely to be too high, thus failing to capture all feigners. 
Perhaps a medial cut-score can be found that is less sensitive to changes in genuine 
psychopathology (i.e., improving specificity) but is still sensitive to changes in feigning 
(i.e., maintaining sensitivity). Van Impelen and colleagues (2014) suggested a range of 
cut-scores (i.e., > 16, > 19, 17 to 19, and > 24) from which examiners could choose, 
depending on whether the SIMS is used as a screener, as part of a larger test battery for 
feigning, and for detection of possible versus conclusive feigning. This is certainly a 
direction for future research. However, with either the > 14 or > 44 cut-scores, this 
feigning screener is unlikely to fulfill its very purpose. Thus, it may benefit forensic 
examiners to use other measures to screen and assess for feigned psychopathology until a 
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Supervised by Wendy Elliott, Ph.D. 
 
Aug 2016 – May 2017 Practicum Student, Psychological Services Center 
Sam Houston State University 
Supervised by Craig Henderson, Ph.D. 
 
Mar 2014 – Jan 2017 Contract Writer, Forensic psychologist private practice 
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Supervised by Stacey Shipley, Psy.D. 
  
Sept 2013 – July 2015 Psychological Assistant, North Texas State Hospital- Vernon 
Campus, Maximum Security Unit 
Supervised by Jodi Blaszyk, Psy.D., and Michele Borynski, 
Ph.D. 
 
Jan 2013 – May 2013 Practicum Student, North Texas State Hospital- Vernon 
campus, Maximum Security Unit 
Supervised by Michele Borynski, Ph.D. 
 
Apr 2012 – May 2013 Practicum Student, Psychology Clinic 
Midwestern State University 
Supervised by Laura Spiller, Ph.D., and Kelly Meyering, Psy.D. 
 
Sept 2011 – Apr 2012  Volunteer, North Texas State Hospital- Wichita Falls campus 
 
Research 
Aug 2015 – July 2019 Research Lab Member, Boccaccini Lab 
Sam Houston State University 
Supervised by Marcus Boccaccini, Ph.D. 
 
July 2016 – Nov 2018 Research Lab Member, Youth and Family Studies Lab 
Sam Houston State University 
Supervised by Amanda Venta, Ph.D. 
 
July 2016 – Dec 2016  Research Interviewer, The LoneStar Project: Study of Offender 
Trajectories, Associations, and Reentry 
University of Colorado-Boulder, Arizona State University, and 
Sam Houston State University 
Funded by the National Institute of Justice 
Bronze Tier Interviewer  
 
Mar 2016 – Aug 2016 Research Interviewer, Early Markers of Suicidal Behaviors in 
Youth: A Cross Sectional Study 
University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston and 
University of Houston 
 
Jan 2012 – May 2013 Research Lab Member, Sexual Aggression Research Lab 
Midwestern State University 
Supervised by Laura Spiller, Ph.D. 
 
Aug 2011 – May 2012 Research Assistant, Midwestern State University 
Supervised by David Carlston, Ph.D. 
 
Oct 2010 – May 2011 Research Assistant, Concordia University- Irvine 
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Supervised by Robert Flores de Apodaca, Ph.D. 
 
Teaching 
June 2019  Invited Presenter, Mental State at the Time of the Offense: 
Basics of the Insanity Evaluation 
UTHealth-HCPC PGY2 Resident Forensic Didactic Series 
 
June 2019 Invited Presenter, Client Suicide: What Next? 
SHSU Clinical Psychology Ph.D. Program, Spring Speaker 
 
Jan 2017 – May 2017 Teaching Assistant, Personality Psychology (PSYC 4331)  
Sam Houston State University 
 
Aug 2016 – Dec 2016 Teaching Assistant, Abnormal Psychology (PSYC 3331) 
Sam Houston State University 
 
May 2016 – Aug 2016 Teaching Assistant, Developmental Psychology (PSYC 3374) 
Sam Houston State University 
 
Jan 2016 – May 2016 Teaching Assistant, Developmental Psychology (PSYC 3374) 
Sam Houston State University 
 
Jan 2013 – May 2013 Teaching Assistant, General Psychology (PSYC 1103) 
Midwestern State University 
 
Aug 2012 – Dec 2012 Teaching Assistant, General Psychology (PSYC 1103) 
Midwestern State University 
 
Supervision 
May 2017 – Aug 2017 Peer Supervisor, Psychological Services Center 
Beginning Doctoral Practicum 
 
Jan 2017 – May 2017 Peer Supervisor, Psychological Services Center 
Theory and Research in Psychotherapy I 
 
Committee 
Aug 2017 – Aug 2019  Student Liaison, Teaching, Training, and Careers Committee 
American Psychology-Law Society (APA Div. 41) 
 
Book Chapter 
Boccaccini, M. T., & Hart, J. R. (2018). Response style on the Personality Assessment 
Inventory and other multiscale inventories. In R. Rogers & S. D. Bender (Eds.), 






Hart, J. R., Venta, A., & Sharp, C. (2017). Attachment and thought problems in an 
adolescent inpatient sample: The mediational role of theory of mind. 




Hart, J. R., & Thomas, K. (Under review). Borderline traits and apparent 
overreporting: Exploring the relation between personality and response validity. 
Paper submitted for presentation at the annual convention of the American 
Psychology-Law Society, New Orleans, LA.  
 
Hart, J. R. & Boccaccini, M. T. (2019, March). False positives for SIMS cut scores 
among inmates with and without mental illness. Paper presented at the annual 
convention of the American Psychology- Law Society, Portland, OR.  
 
Ball Cooper, E., Hart, J., & Venta, A. (2019, March). The moderating role of inmate 
housing placement on hopelessness and psychopathology. Paper presented at the 
annual convention of the American Psychology-Law Society, Portland, OR. 
 
Hart, J. R., Reinhard, E. E., Boccaccini, M. T., Domino, M., & Cooper, V. (2018, 
March). Correspondence between Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms’ 
(SIRS) scores and clinicians’ opinions of malingering. Paper presented at the 
annual convention of the American Psychology- Law Society, Memphis, TN.  
 
Hart, J. R., Kavish, N., & Boccaccini, M. T. (2017, March). Feigning in a correctional 
sample: Associations of SIMS scores with elevations on other measures. Poster 
presented at the annual convention of the American Psychology- Law Society, 
Seattle, WA. 
 
Abate, A., Harmon, J., Marshall, K., Hart, J., Ball, E., Henderson, C., Desforges, D., & 
Venta, A. (2017, March). Perceptions of the legal system and recidivism: 
Investigating the mediating role of perceptions of chances for success in juvenile 
offenders. Paper presented at the annual convention of the American Psychology- 
Law Society, Seattle. 
 
Hart, J. R., Sharp, C., & Venta, A. (2016, November). Attachment and thought problems 
in an adolescent inpatient population: The mediational role of theory of mind. 
Paper presented at the annual convention of the Texas Psychological Association, 
Austin, TX. 
 
Magyar, M. S., Ball, E. M., & Hart, J. R. (2016, June). Borderline features: Critical 
mediator in the relation between childhood maltreatment and diverse aggressive 
and delinquent features among justice-involved youth. Paper presented at the 
annual convention of the International Association of Forensic Mental Health 




Hart, J. R., Magyar, M. S., Ball, E. M., Camins, J., Ridge, B., & Edens, J. (2016, 
March). Using the Personality Assessment Inventory-Adolescent to predict high-
risk behaviors among juvenile male offenders. Paper presented at the annual 
convention of the American Psychology- Law Society, Atlanta, GA. 
 
Abate, A. C., Magyar, M., Ball, E., Ricardo, M., Hart, J., & Edens, J. (2016, March). 
Use of the Personality Assessment Inventory-Adolescent to assess trauma-related 
symptoms in justice-involved youth. Paper presented at the annual convention of 
the American Psychology- Law Society, Atlanta, GA. 
 
Cook, J. R., Carlston, D. L., Callaway, L. R., & Price, A. (2013, April). Imposing 
cognitive load to facilitate lie detection: Tapping as a secondary task. Poster 
presented at the annual convention of the Southwestern Psychological 
Association, Fort Worth, TX.  
 
Strug, A. M., Cook, J. R., Spiller, L. C., & Davis, J. (2012, April). Measuring college 
women’s perception of competition for their romantic partner. Paper presented at 
the annual convention of the Southwestern Psychological Association, Oklahoma 
City, OK.  
 
Conference Reviewer Positions 
2018  Student Reviewer, American Psychology-Law Society (APA Div. 41) 
2017  Student Reviewer, American Psychology-Law Society (APA Div. 41) 
2016  Student Reviewer, American Psychology-Law Society (APA Div. 41) 
2015  Student Reviewer, American Psychology-Law Society (APA Div. 41) 
2014  Student Reviewer, American Psychology-Law Society (APA Div. 41) 
 
Certifications 
2017 Teaching Assistant Certification Series, Sam Houston State University 
2016 Columbia Suicide Severity Rating Scale (C-SSRS) 
 
Professional Affiliations 
Sep 2016 – present  Texas Psychological Association  
Apr 2012 – present American Psychology- Law Society (APA Div. 41) 
Mar 2012 – present American Psychological Association 
Jan 2012 – Jan 2014 Southwestern Psychological Association 
May 2010- present Psi Chi, National Honor Society in Psychology 
 
Honors and Awards 
2019 Student Travel Award, American Psychology-Law Society 
2018 – 2019 AP-LS Childcare Grant, American Psychology-Law Society, Professional 
Development of Women Committee 
2017 2017 Continuing Education (CE) Pre-Conference Grant, American 
Psychology-Law Society 
2016  SHAPA Travel Award, Sam Houston Area Psychological Association 
2014  “Watch Me Shine” Annual Award, North Texas State Hospital 
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2011 – 2013 Graduate Merit Scholarship, Midwestern State University 
2011 – 2012 Arbor Creek Scholarship, Maven Management 
2011 – 2012 Chellgren Family Scholarship, Omicron Delta Kappa Foundation 
2008 – 2011 Presidential Scholarship, Concordia University 
2010  Leader of the Year Award, Omicron Delta Kappa, Concordia University 
 
